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CITING THE ELITE:  
THE BURDEN OF AUTHORIAL ANXIETY 
SHANE TINTLE† 
ABSTRACT 
  Academic legal writing is known for extensive citation. Generally, 
scholars who study citation practices are increasingly likely to link 
citation with authors’ attempts to manage their impression. This Note 
offers an explanation of why authors of law review articles use 
citation as a means of managing impression. It combines a historical 
analysis that shows why excessive citation became conventional with a 
literary analysis that shows why excessive citation was unique in its 
ability to aid academics in substantively contributing to the bench and 
bar. It further shows how, because of the historic and literary 
significance of citation, a norm compelling excessive citation pervades 
the legal community. Finally, this Note questions this norm’s 
continued value given that excessive citation exacts a collateral price 
on the legal community and that law review readers are increasingly 
diverse. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Had I remained on the Supreme Court, I would have reversed 
him on [account of his five hundred footnotes] because of the sheer 
impossibility of reviewing an opinion of this type.”1 Justice Arthur 
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 1. Arthur J. Goldberg, The Rise and Fall (We Hope) of Footnotes, 69 A.B.A. J. 255, 255 
(1983) (referring to a particular circuit opinion he had read after stepping down from the 
Supreme Court). 
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Goldberg’s sentiments abound among legal readers.2 Nevertheless, 
authors, particularly those of law review articles, continue to cite 
excessively. In fact, the New York Law School Law Review once 
published an article containing 4,824 footnotes.3 The persistence of 
excessive citation despite widespread critique begs explanation. 
Citation within legal writing is a complex practice that has long 
attracted commentary.4 Some scholars have examined the citation 
practices of judges to enhance understanding of how judges decide 
cases.5 Other scholars have analyzed citation in academic articles in 
ways that suggest broad answers to existential questions about the 
state of the academy and its relation to the broader legal community.6 
 
 2. For a discussion of the negative impact of excessive citation on writing style, see infra 
Part IV.A. 
 3. Arnold S. Jacobs, An Analysis of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 209 (1987). 
 4. In recent history, the highest profile study of legal citation is Fred R. Shapiro’s work. 
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540 (1985); see also 
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751 
(1996) (providing an update of his earlier findings). 
 5. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and 
Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 794 (1981) (“Citation patterns thus set forth the authority on 
which a case rests. . . . Changes in these patterns may be barometers of changes in the way 
judges think about their roles and about the sources and limits of their power. These patterns 
may be clues, too, to the role of courts in society.”); John Henry Merryman, The Authority of 
Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 613 (1954) 
(“The Supreme Court of California is composed of seven judges whose habits of citation of 
authority differ to some extent, making a study of those habits of interest to legal scholars who 
like to test theory with practice, to judges themselves, who may enjoy the self-examinations 
which such a study provides, and to practicing attorneys who wish to know what authority 
impresses the highest court of the state.”); David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal 
Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 
337 (1997) (“The main question posed [in this study] is whether . . . judges use citations as 
indicators of substantial influence on their decisionmaking . . . .”). 
 6. See, e.g., Arthur Austin, Footnote Skulduggery and Other Bad Habits, 44 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 1009, 1011 (1990) [hereinafter Austin, Footnote Skulduggery] (“Authors have recognized 
that discerning, intelligent—or unethical—manipulation of footnotes can be a significant factor 
in achieving promotion, tenure, and status.”); Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product 
Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1987) [hereinafter Austin, Footnotes as Product] 
(“Footnoting has evolved from primitive origins and use as a ‘pure’ reference into an artistic 
and abstruse discipline that functions as a subtle, but critical, influence in the determination of 
promotion, tenure, and professional status.” (citations omitted)); J.M. Balkin & Sanford 
Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843, 868 (1996) 
(“Citations are . . . a handy way of establishing some measure of group identity or solidarity. . . . 
The psychological benefits of reciprocal citation may be particularly important when members 
of a particular group view themselves as otherwise marginalized by the larger academy.”); 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-Theorized Asterisk Footnote, 93 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1094 (2005) 
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In addition, scholars have suggested that academic legal authors cite 
frequently to manage impression carefully.7 
Furthermore, in light of the frequency with which most legal 
authors cite, it appears that there is a consensus that a heavy dose of 
citation is a good way to manage impression. Yet few analyses 
actually attempt to deconstruct this assumption.8 What shared values 
contribute to a consensus that citation is a good way, or at least an 
effective way, to manage impression? The answer to such a question 
is relevant because excessive citation has negative collateral effects, 
many of which exact a substantial burden on the legal community. 
This Note offers an explanation for the emphasis on citation. It 
shows how an “anxiety of authority”9 has developed, and remains 
shared among academic legal authors, prompting extensive citation. 
This anxiety of authority refers to authors’ insecurity about the 
capacity of their written product to evoke the desired response from 
their intended audience. Within the academic legal context, this 
insecurity or anxiety is complicated because judges have been the 
audience to which legal scholars have often historically addressed 
their work.10 Judges, however, constitute an audience bound by a 
number of conflicting pressures—pressures that generally impede the 
 
(arguing that study of the identifying asterisk footnote that begins most review articles sheds 
“new light on the legal academy”). 
 7. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 867 (“Citations, we think, are often just 
such a form of public relations or impression management.”); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship 
Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 937 (1990) 
(“[M]any modern professors tend to toss their excess research into the annotation hopper . . . . 
[I]t’s safer . . . (allowing the writer to straddle any issue by taking a strong position in the text 
while waffling below) . . . not to mention more ego-gratifying (enabling intricate citation of 
arcane sources at stupefying length).”); Sullivan, supra note 6, at 1113 (“Another possibility, 
then, is that the use of acknowledgements [via footnotes] is designed to maximize placement 
success by providing the law reviews with a signals that this piece is really important . . . .”). 
 8. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 846 (“We had planned to write an entire 
essay along these lines, dutifully showing how academic conceptions of merit were constructed 
by the economy of citation . . . . But, after discussing the issue between ourselves for several 
weeks, we gradually realized that most readers . . . couldn’t care less about our views on these 
weighty theoretical matters.”). 
 9. The phrase “anxiety of authority” comes from Michael Bacchus who, in turn, has 
modified Harold Bloom’s “anxiety of influence.” See Michael Bacchus, Strung Out: Legal 
Citation, The Bluebook, and the Anxiety of Authority, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 245, 249 (2002) (citing, 
inter alia, HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY (1973)). 
Used here, however, the phrase has a slightly modified meaning. Specifically, the phrase seeks 
to capture certain insecurities all authors encounter in authoring a piece, but that have become 
especially acute within the legal context because of legal authors’ audiences. 
 10. See infra notes 24–43 and accompanying text. 
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influence a law review article might otherwise have over them.11 Thus, 
within the legal context, the pressures that bind judges actually 
exacerbate the general anxiety of authority that authors encounter. 
This Note argues that excessive citation developed as a unique 
literary device that enhanced the ability of academic authors to play a 
substantive role in the resolution of issues because of its semiotic 
force. As a result, heavy citation became, and remains, standard 
within academic legal writing. 
Yet this Note also encourages a fresh and sustained evaluation of 
citation practices by individual authors in light of the costs and 
benefits associated with heavy citation. Specifically, if authors’ desire 
to influence judges provided the initial impetus for heavy citation, as 
this Note argues,12 then heavy citation may not always be necessary, at 
least for its historic reasons. Academic legal authors write for 
numerous purposes, and citation may not be the literary tool 
appropriate for authors’ purposes.13 Along these lines, this Note 
highlights certain costs that citation exacts upon individual writing, 
potential audiences, and the legal community, to show that there is a 
particularly pressing need for authors to tailor citation techniques to 
serve their purposees most effectively. 
This Note builds on the theoretical work of Harold Bloom,14 
beginning from the premise that “no [author] . . . speaks a language 
 
 11. The pressures under which judges labor might be more simply defined as the distinct 
pressures not to depart entirely from existing law and to explain why the law justifies the result 
in the particular case. Both pressures urge judges to resort to precedent and, as a result, to turn 
away from novel interpretations proffered in academic legal articles. See infra notes 49–54 and 
accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Parts II–IV. 
 13. For example, given that this Note is a nondoctrinal work, were it written by an 
established academic, a heavy emphasis on citation might be inappropriate. Such citation would 
probably only distract from the above-the-line text. Because this is a student-written Note, 
however, the heavy use of citation is appropriate. Not only do student authors need to establish 
authority and credibility through the heavy use of citation, students’ abilities to scour through 
sources and manage them properly below-the-line displays an acuity which future employers, 
particularly the judges for whom students clerk, might find attractive. For these reasons, this 
Note is only slightly sparing in its citation. 
 14. Bloom’s ideas regarding the causes and anxieties prompting authorship are particularly 
useful for thinking about citation practices in academic legal writing. When Bloom describes the 
new poet’s experience—“[i]nitial love for the precursor’s poetry is transformed rapidly enough 
into revisionary strife, without which individuation is not possible[]”—he describes a process by 
which a linguistic heritage is both established and modified within literary traditions. HAROLD 
BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING 10 (1975). This Note, in some ways, fleshes out how a 
particular linguistic heritage, that of excessive citation, has become conventional within the 
academic legal tradition. 
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free from the one wrought by his precursors.”15 This makes the history 
of academic legal writing particularly relevant, given that preceding 
authors have compiled, pruned, and shaped the language used within 
the genre.16 In other words, because the assumptions and anxieties 
under which authors have historically labored have slowly molded a 
linguistic tradition sustained, often unknowingly, by contemporary 
heirs, the historical context that might explain the emergence of those 
assumptions is relevant to understanding why authors write (and cite) 
as they do. 
Part I of this Note sets up the historical context in which the 
dominant medium of legal scholarship, the student-edited law review, 
developed. It further shows how authors of legal scholarship, even at 
the most prestigious institutions, readily placed themselves within a 
tradition which sought to aid judges in resolving actual conflicts 
among litigants. Part I describes this tradition as a common enterprise 
among academic legal authors and the bench. Part II demonstrates 
how the purposes of this shared enterprise sharpened the anxiety of 
authority and how citation became a useful device to manage this 
anxiety. Part III argues that this anxiety has become standardized 
within the academic legal community. Part IV rehearses and 
embellishes upon various critiques of citation to highlight that despite 
the benefits that may adhere to this convention, it is not without 
substantial cost. Finally, Part V suggests that, in light of the fact that 
judges no longer predominate the audience of academic authors, 
authors should directly address the issue of footnoting before writing 
an article. Such direct attention to footnoting would help prevent 
authors from unconsciously and unnecessarily adopting authorial 
personas freighted with anachronistic anxieties. 
I.  THE HISTORY AND CLASSIC FUNCTION OF THE  
STUDENT-EDITED LAW REVIEW 
Contemporary legal scholars are the heirs of a linguistic 
tradition, conspicuously present in the law review,17 that underwent its 
most significant period of development at a time when legal 
scholarship constituted one component of a common enterprise that 
 
 15. BLOOM, supra note 9, at 25. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. Cf. Lasson, supra note 7, at 928 (“Legal scholarship is largely illustrated by the law 
reviews which, conversely, both contribute to and reflect the value system by which the academy 
is governed.”). 
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unified the legal community.18 Yet it was not always this way, and the 
importance of the student-edited law review grew slowly over time.19 
Although legal periodicals first emerged in America early in the 
nineteenth century, the development of the student-edited law review 
would have to wait for the better part of the century.20 It was not until 
1887 that Harvard published its first issue, becoming the first 
successful student-edited law review still in publication today.21 
Within the next twenty years, however, Yale, Pennsylvania, 
Columbia, Michigan, and Northwestern all followed suit.22 Soon 
thereafter, the number of student-edited law reviews mushroomed.23 
 
 18. Although legal scholarship is always evolving, Edward L. Rubin’s 1988 description of 
“standard legal scholarship” evidences the importance of the relationship between the academy 
and the bench throughout the history of law reviews and legal scholarship: 
When viewed as an academic discourse, the most distinctive feature of standard legal 
scholarship is its prescriptive voice, its consciously declared desire to improve the 
performance of legal decisionmakers. . . . [T]he point of an article about a judicial 
decision is usually to remonstrate with the judge for the conclusion reached and for 
the rationale adopted. The point of an article about a statutory provision or 
regulation is to expose the errors made in drafting it, and to indicate what should 
have been done instead. 
Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 
1847–53 (1988). Implicit throughout this description is the understanding that a particular 
audience of lawmakers makes up the audience of the scholarship. Another way of 
understanding this implication is to say that authors of “standard legal scholarship” perceive 
themselves, in no small part, as playing an integral role alongside other lawmakers to improve 
the legal system. 
 19. Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An 
Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659, 661 (1998). In fact, in 1956 Judge Julius J. Hoffman 
wrote: 
Law Reviews had yet to gain the status they enjoy today and in an era when age 
insistently demanded respect without always according reciprocal consideration to 
youth, writers and editors in the law schools not infrequently had to fear the 
derogation, skepticism and, at times, the resentment of some judges and lawyers. 
Julius J. Hoffman, Law Reviews and the Bench, 51 NW. U. L. REV. 17, 17 (1956). 
 20. See Michael L. Closen & Robert J. Dzielak, The History and Influence of the Law 
Review Institution, 30 AKRON L. REV. 15, 30–38 (1996) (reviewing the history of early legal 
periodicals). 
 21. Id. at 35. The University of Pennsylvania also claims to have the first continuously 
published law review, tracing its roots back to the publication of the American Law Register in 
1851. McClintock, supra note 19, at 663 n.29; see also Joseph P. Flanagan, Introduction, 100 U. 
PA. L. REV. 69, 69 (1951) (rehearsing the history of the Pennsylvania Law Review). 
 22. McClintock, supra note 19, at 663. 
 23. In fact, by 1931 Benjamin Cardozo qualitatively emphasized the stature of the law 
review: 
Judges and advocates may not relish the admission, but the sobering truth is that 
leadership in the march of legal thought has been passing in our day from the benches 
of the courts to the chairs of universities. . . . [T]he outstanding fact is here that 
academic scholarship is charting the line of development and progress in the 
untrodden regions of the law. 
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The saturation of the legal community with an abundance of new 
publications brought with it increased pressure for those publications 
to specialize. More often than not, the particular audiences sought 
were the bench and the bar.24 For example, the editors of the 
Northwestern School of Law’s first student-edited publication stated: 
“Undoubtedly the field for law reviews of a general character is 
already overcrowded. . . . It is believed, however, that there is genuine 
and widespread need of a live periodical primarily devoted to the 
discussion and exposition of Illinois law . . . .”25 Targeting this 
audience, authors constructed their articles largely by sifting through 
settled precedent and established doctrine in ways that would provide 
insight probative to the resolution of particular exigent issues.26 
Essentially, scholars were conducting doctrinal analysis that would be 
immediately helpful to the bench and bar. 
The classic article on privacy rights, The Right to Privacy,27 
written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, provides an excellent 
example of the type of scholarship and the relationships that emerged 
between the bench and the nascent student-edited reviews.28 Warren 
and Brandeis wrote their article in response to a case that the New 
York Superior Court had decided in which the essential elements of a 
privacy tort claim were present.29 Hoping to help resolve the issue, 
Warren and Brandeis stated: “It is our purpose to consider whether 
the existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to 
 
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction, in SELECTED READINGS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at 
vii, ix (George J. Thompson et al. eds., 1931). 
 24. For discussion on how law review articles are helpful to the bench and bar, see Bernard 
J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 615, 623 n.33 (1996). 
 25. Frederic C. Woodward, Editorial Notes, 1 ILL. L. REV. 39, 39 (1906). 
 26. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 
18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 174 (2006) (“[T]he familiar work [of the legal academy is] offering 
expert advice and advocacy on contemporary legal questions for the benefit of the bench and 
bar. Until the 1970s, offering such advice was the standard practice of law professors, and their 
legal scholarship viewed judges . . . as their ideal readers.”). 
 27. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 28. See McClintock, supra note 19, at 666 (“Overcoming their initial prejudice, courts 
sought out law reviews to assist in their judicial decision making, and from the beginning, courts 
cited articles that had been tailored to address the legal problems before them. . . . One of the 
first examples of such an article was a doctrinal piece written by Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis titled The Right to Privacy.” (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra note 27)). 
 29. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 27, at 195–96. 
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protect the privacy of the individual . . . .”30 Concluding that the 
existing tort law did in fact recognize a right to privacy, they desired 
that their article would influence judicial decisions. Despite the fact 
that the New York Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the 
conclusions of their article in 1902,31 the article eventually did have a 
profound impact on both statutory and common law throughout the 
country.32 
Warren and Brandeis’s exchange with the New York courts 
typifies two characteristics of early law review articles. First, their 
article had a specific audience.33 Due to urbanization, the advent of 
the high-speed rotary printing presses, and other social transitions 
derivative of the industrial movement, scandalous news—whether 
true or not—had an ability to do far more damage to reputation than 
a quarter of a century before.34 These social changes were pressing the 
courts to decide cases at the borders of traditional categories, forcing 
judges to stretch traditional doctrines in new ways.35 Warren and 
Brandeis sought to aid the bench in resolving the privacy issue; their 
audience was specific. Second, Warren and Brandeis worked under 
the assumption that the bench might actually use their work in 
resolving the issue. They found precedent, resolved that precedent, 
and drew substantive conclusions intending to advance the court’s 
ability to interpret existing doctrine in light of the changed 
 
 30. Id. at 197. 
 31. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902) (“Mention of 
such a [privacy] right is not to be found in Blackstone, Kent, or any other of the great 
commentators upon the law; nor, so far as the learning of counsel or the courts in this case have 
been able to discover, does its existence seem to have been asserted prior to about the year 
1890, when it was presented with attractiveness, and no inconsiderable ability, in the Harvard 
Law Review . . . in an article entitled ‘Rights of a Citizen to His Reputation.’”). 
 32. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74, 78–79 (Ga. 1905) 
(adopting the views of Warren and Brandeis); see also William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. 
REV. 383, 385–89 (1960) (discussing the development of the tort of invasion of privacy following 
Roberson). 
 33. Warren and Brandeis framed the issue specifically as a question of common law. By 
doing so, they targeted an audience consisting of judges who shaped that common law. See 
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 27, at 193 (“Political, social, and economic changes entail the 
recognition of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the demands 
of society.” (emphasis added)). 
 34. Id. at 195–96. 
 35. See id. at 204 (“Although the courts have asserted that they rested their decisions on 
the narrow grounds of protection to property, yet there are recognitions of a more liberal 
doctrine.”). 
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circumstances of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.36 
Based on these two observations, Warren and Brandeis probably 
valued the success of their scholarship as a function of its impact on 
the way the bench decided cases dealing with privacy.37 Because 
Warren and Brandeis wrote to influence the bench, hoping that it 
would explicitly recognize individual privacy interests, the actions of 
the bench determined their success or failure. 
Furthermore, The Right to Privacy shows that even the most 
prestigious law reviews, even in their nascent years, sought to publish 
scholarship that stood in direct relation to the bench.38 The law 
reviews published articles engaged in doctrinal analysis, the value of 
which depended in large part on the bench’s reception. This dynamic, 
or interface, molded the classic purpose of the law review: “to instruct 
attorneys in their consideration of legal problems [and] to guide 
judges and other decisionmakers in their resolution of legal 
disputes.”39 Addressing the purpose and value of the law review, 
Judge Stanley Fuld phrased it nicely in 1953: 
We admire the law review for its scholarship, its accuracy, and, 
above all, for its excruciating fairness. We are well aware that the 
review takes very seriously its role as judge of judges—and to that, 
we say, more power to you. By your criticisms, your views, your 
appraising cases, your tracing the trends, you render the making of 
‘new’ law a little easier.40 
In other words, by a “careful reading and comparison of appellate 
opinions with a view to identifying ambiguities, exposing 
 
 36. See, e.g., id. at 205 (“[In Prince Albert v. Strange,] Lord Cottenham stated that a man ‘is 
entitled to be protected in the exclusive use and enjoyment of that which is exclusively his,’ and 
cited with approval the opinion of Lord Eldon, as reported in a manuscript note of the case of 
Wyatt v. Wilson, in 1820, respecting an engraving of George the Third during his illness, to the 
effect that ‘if one of the late king’s physicians had kept a diary of what he heard and saw, the 
court would not, in the king’s lifetime, have permitted him to print and publish it.’”). 
 37. This is a natural conclusion. It simply particularizes the more general intuition that the 
efficacy of something seeking to be normative is most properly determined by evaluating its 
capacity to change the way its targeted audience actually acts. See Michel Foucault, Afterword 
to MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 216–18 (Hubert 
L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow eds., 2d ed. 1983). 
 38. See generally McClintock, supra note 19, at 667 (“Once their initial prejudice had 
subsided, courts began to seek out law review articles dealing with the legal issues of the day to 
assist in their judicial decisions. These articles often shaped the law.”). 
 39. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 42–43 (1992). 
 40. Stanley H. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 918 (1953). 
05__TINTLE.DOC 12/6/2007  8:55:24 AM 
496 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:487 
inconsistencies among cases and lines of cases, developing 
distinctions, reconciling holdings, and otherwise exercising the 
characteristic skills of legal analysis,”41 law reviews provided a 
particular utility to the bench. In a sense, then, the authors were 
bound to the bench and the bar by a common purpose: resolving 
conflict for particular litigants.42 There was a common enterprise 
between the academy and the practicing legal community, and the 
academy communicated to the practitioners through the law review.43 
II.  THE POWER OF CITATION TO ENDEAR  
ACADEMIC TO JUDICIAL WRITING 
The authors of early law review articles sought, consciously or 
unconsciously, to manage their impressions to best achieve their 
primary goals—often to influence the way a particular judge 
ultimately decided a particular case or issue.44 To do so, as in all 
extended dialogues, the parties involved utilized personas45 that 
reflected their positions relative to one another and their interests in 
 
 41. Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1113 
(1981); see also Cardozo, supra note 23, at ix (stating that law reviews were able to “canalize the 
stream [of legal precedent] and redeem the inundated fields”). In fact, law reviews garnered 
their first Supreme Court citation in a dissent from 1897, United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Assoc., 166 U.S. 290, 350 n.1 (1897) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Amasa M. Eaton, On 
Contracts and Restraint of Trade, 4 HARV. L. REV. 128 (1890)), and in the majority in 1899, 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Clark, 178 U.S. 353, 365 (1899) (citing James Ames, 
Two Theories of Consideration, 12 HARV. L. REV. 515 (1899)). 
 42. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 43. Judge Hoffman’s statement in 1956 captures the relationship and common purpose of 
the reviews and the bench: “Speaking for the bench, it is possible to say that [law reviews] are 
not only accepted but also are very welcome additions to the literature of the law.” Hoffman, 
supra note 19, at 17. 
 44. There were, of course, scholars who expressly did not write for the bench, but the 
scholarship propelling the “Golden Age” of the student-edited review was primarily directed 
toward the bench. See Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1995) (describing the rise of forms of scholarship other than doctrinal 
analysis after the “Golden Age”). 
 45. Persona simply means an organizing consciousness of the text. In other words, the 
reader should not evaluate the text as if it were a personal confession of the author, but rather 
as if it were a narrative presented and organized by a purposefully created construction of the 
author. Essentially, it is the alter ego of the author. Although many post-structuralists will 
question the notion of an organizing consciousness, see, e.g., Roland Barthes, The Death of the 
Author, reprinted in IMAGE—MUSIC—TEXT 142, 143–48 (Stephen Heath ed. & trans., 1977), 
the concept remains invaluable as a heuristic tool for organizing the narrative of a particular 
text. 
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the relationship.46 It is important to make clear, then, exactly what the 
interest of the authors was in the relationship: to gain acceptance into 
an official governmental proceeding. They sought to influence the 
judge, however subtly, in ordering the affairs of the litigants. There 
were, however, significant hurdles that these authors had to overcome 
to fulfill their purpose. 
First, in official judicial proceedings, each a chapter in the 
ongoing legal narrative, academic authors are outsiders.47 Judges, at 
least in their official capacity within that narrative, play the role of 
norm providers to the litigants.48 This role generally burdens judges in 
at least two ways. First, it pressures judges not to depart entirely from 
existing law.49 Second, it pressures judges to “explain to the parties 
 
 46. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS (1974) (providing background 
reading about the framework within which authors generally communicate with readers). For an 
analogous example of how the audience of a law review continues to influence authorial 
anxieties in profound ways, see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Outsiders-Insiders: The Academy of the 
Closet, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977, 978 (1996). Explaining why legal scholars hesitate to identify 
their sexual orientation in print despite other minorities readily doing so, he states: 
An explanation must start with the paradox that America is both anxious about and 
obsessed with sexuality; both push the gay author of an insider article away from 
disclosure. If the imagined reader and the author are both anxious and indeed 
embarrassed about sexuality, then reasons of privacy will suggest to the author that 
she purge her article of sexual orientation. 
Id. In much the same way, the anxieties of the judges to whom academic scholars often wrote 
necessarily shaped the way in which they constructed their texts. 
 47. In the early years, authors often met with judicial resistance. A large part of this 
resistance was, and continues to be, due to sociological reasons. For example, Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes discouraged the use of law review articles in briefs because they were the 
“work of boys.” Judith S. Kaye, One Judge’s View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 313, 316 (1989). Surely, the object of Holmes’s remark was the youth of journals’ 
editors. Yet the problem of authority and legitimacy sustained this sociological critique. 
 48. Cf. Edward R. Becker, In Praise of Footnotes, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 3 (1996) (“By 
demonstrating to litigants and lawyers that they have been heard, written opinions reinforce the 
bar’s confidence in the bench and enhance the legitimacy of the judicial process in the eyes of 
the people.”); Michael Sinclair, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 373 (2007) (“Do you know how 
they make [common law]? Just as a man makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything 
you want to break him of, you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it. This is the way you 
make laws for your dog: and this is they way judges make law for you and me.” (quoting 
JEREMY BENTHAM, Of Promulgation of the Laws and Promulgations of the Reasons Thereof, in 
5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 235 (John Bowring ed., 1859))). 
 49. This is not a recent epiphany. As Alexander Hamilton wrote long ago, “[t]o avoid an 
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound by strict rules and 
precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes 
before them.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 168 (Alexander Hamilton) (Frederick Quinn ed., 
1997). Though there are times when law is overturned, see, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 
294 (1955) (overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine), this does not change the fact that 
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why the law compels (or at least justifies) a certain result in a 
particular case.”50 These twin pressures, in large part, explain the 
propensity of common law judges to resort to precedent.51 By 
skillfully constructing precedential narratives, judges not only make 
their particular holdings seem inevitable but do so in a way that 
suggests that reasonable citizens could have predicted properly how 
the law would respond to their acts.52 This is important because 
“justice demands, wherever that concept is found, that like men be 
treated alike in like conditions.”53 These narratives, however, are not 
all-inclusive. Simply by selecting precedent upon which to ground 
their holdings, judges underscore the type of reasoning that is to be 
used and, by implication, that which is not. Because of this 
exclusionary tendency, judicially created precedential narratives often 
marginalize the reasoning of academics.54 
Second, upon gaining acceptance into the legal narrative, authors 
actually further complicate their status. As Professor John Henry 
Merryman noted long ago, “[when] the courts cite [secondary 
authorities] then [those authorities] are in some sense law as a result 
of the citation.”55 Once accepted, the author’s work not only gains 
 
generally “it is desirable that a person should be able to predict with some degree of certainty 
what might be the legal consequence of a particular action.” Merryman, supra note 5, at 622. 
 50. Bruce M. Selya, In Search of Less, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1996). 
 51. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 48, at 370 (“Following precedent tends to show that the 
court is not following the whims of political winds or the judge’s own predilections; that she is 
not, in the fashionable phrase, legislating from the bench.”); Walsh, supra note 5, at 351–52 
(providing empirical research to show that judges often use citations as a way of legitimizing 
their holdings). 
 52. Cf. PRISCILLA WALD, CONSTITUTING AMERICANS 47–48 (1995) (“As a lawyer, 
Abraham Lincoln had learned to construct legal narratives that continually invoked and 
obscured origins in order to establish the ‘categorical authority’ of the law. These legal 
narratives, in other words, authorized their claims by retroactively but obscurely choosing a 
point of departure and making a sequence of events lead naturally and inevitably to a particular 
interpretation of the present. Such narratives derived . . . their authority from the rhetoric of 
inevitability . . . .” (citing Jacques Derrida, Devant La Loi, in KAFKA AND THE 
CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL PERFORMANCE: CENTENARY READINGS 128–49 (Alan Udoff ed., 
Avital Ronell trans., 1987))). 
 53. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 36 (1930). 
 54. See, e.g., supra note 47 (explaining Justice Holmes’s initial discouragement of the use of 
law review articles in official legal writing). 
 55. Merryman, supra note 5, at 621. In fact, the publishers of The Bluebook validated this 
claim in their response to Professor A. Darby Dickerson’s critique of the sixteenth edition. 
Professor Dickerson reminded the legal community that “[c]hanging what the [citation] signals 
mean effectively changes the substance of our common law.” A. Darby Dickerson, An Un-
Uniform System of Citation: Surviving with the New Bluebook, 26 STETSON L. REV. 53, 69 
(1996). The publishers quickly responded by publishing the seventeenth edition, which reverted 
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insider status, but, incredibly, gains official status. Thus, a mere 
citation, or even clear judicial reasoning traceable to the logic of a law 
review article, changes the ontological status of that article from 
secondary literature into law. This, in turn, creates complications for 
judges given the pressures deriving from their official relationship 
with the litigants. How can judges maintain legitimacy within the legal 
narrative as norm providers when they seem to concede that 
authority to the author of the article?56 Such a maneuver surely 
bucked the perceived role of a judge during the nascent years of early 
law reviews. 
Conceptually, both hurdles derive from issues of authority. The 
first—the use of precedent—involves judges masterfully protecting 
their legitimacy in an effort to ensure their authority, at the expense 
of those marginalized. Similarly, the second—the conferral of official 
status—only arises because judges are in positions of authority, which 
stimulates pressure to protect the legitimacy of that authority. Thus, a 
central problem slowing success for early academic authors in law 
reviews was one of authority. There was an onus on such authors to 
create authority. To avoid tainting the legitimacy of judges’ actions, 
authors had to portray an authority through their texts which, if given 
official status via judicial recognition, would not become officious. 
 
to the signal rules that preceded the sixteenth edition, preserving the meaning of the common 
law. See Bacchus, supra note 9, at 252–53 (“In 1996, the Sixteenth Edition appeared, including 
within it momentous changes. . . . The seventeenth edition of The Bluebook reinstates the 
signals of the fifteenth edition with minor changes.”). Compare, e.g., THE BLUEBOOK: A 
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 22 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 16th 
ed. 1996) (changing the use of “[no signal]” to indicate only that the “[c]ited authority (i) 
identifies the source of a quotation, or (ii) identifies an authority referred to in the text” and 
changing the use of the “see” signal to indicate “cited authority [that] directly states . . . the 
proposition”), with THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 22–23 
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 15th ed. 1991) (using “[no signal]” to indicate that the 
“[c]ited authority (i) clearly states the proposition, (ii) identifies the source of a quotation, or 
(iii) identifies an authority referred to in the text” and using the “see” signal “when the 
proposition is not directly stated by the cited authority but obviously follows from it”), and THE 
BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 22–23 (Columbia Law Review 
Ass’n et al. eds., 17th ed. 2000) (reinstating the three meanings of “[no signal]” and the meaning 
of the “see” signal that were used in the fifteenth edition). 
 56. These are issues with which Judge Roger Traynor deals in his dedication celebrating 
the tenth birthday of the UCLA Law Review. Roger J. Traynor, To the Right Honorable Law 
Reviews, 10 UCLA L. REV. 3, 6 (1962). After discussing the emergence of citations to law 
reviews in judicial opinions, he states that “[t]he clumsy explanation [for such emergence] is that 
if it persuasively sets forth what should be authoritative, it may be transmuted surreptitiously 
into what is by those in a position to declare the law.” Id. 
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To portray such authority, law review authors quickly learned to 
construct authoritative personas. A heavy emphasis on footnoting 
became a particularly prominent device in constructing the 
appropriate persona.57 By placing a large emphasis on footnoting, 
academic legal authors betray a struggle to create their own 
authority.58 Although “the basic function of a footnote is to allow ‘the 
interested reader to test the conclusions of the writer and to verify the 
source of a challengeable statement,’”59 footnotes have much greater 
semiotic significance. As early as 1937, Professor Fred Rodell noticed, 
albeit in passing criticism, that footnotes signified a relationship 
between the authors and their readers.60 Through footnoting, authors 
cultivate their relationship with their readers by making two semiotic 
gestures. First, authors signify to their readers that the source to 
which they are citing contains an objective meaning that is knowable 
distinctly apart from the process of its being read.61 Second, authors 
signify that they are accurately channeling that objective meaning to 
their readers.62 When readers readily accept both of these gestures, 
 
 57. In fact, Judge Richard Posner argues that a genre developed in which authors 
“footnot[e] copiously, treat[] every topic exhaustively,” and in which “soundness is valued 
above originality, [and] thoroughness above brevity.” Posner, supra note 41, at 1122. 
 58. For a clear explanation of the technical process, see Sanford Levinson, Law as 
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 382 n.33 (1982). Professor Levinson highlights certain 
epistemological assumptions that sustain the practice of footnoting. Describing his citation to 
Stanley Fish, Levinson writes: 
It occurs to me, as I dutifully footnote Fish’s statement, that the act of footnoting is 
itself a bow toward the notion of objective knowledge, for I am purporting, even as I 
describe Fish’s reader-response theories, to be giving you (the reader) an “accurate” 
rendition of those theories. Indeed, the point of footnotes, especially if “cite-checked” 
by law review editors, is to suggest that the proof of my accuracy is that you would 
arrive at the same conclusions by reading the same material. 
Id. 
 59. Austin, Footnote Skulduggery, supra note 6, at 1012 (quoting Carolyn O. Frost, The Use 
of Citations in Literary Research: A Preliminary Classification of Citation Functions, 49 LIBR. Q. 
399, 399 (1979)). 
 60. Professor Rodell curtly notes that “[e]very legal writer is presumed to be a liar until he 
proves himself otherwise with a flock of footnotes.” Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews—
Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279, 282 (1962). Rodell’s comment assumes that the emphasis on 
footnoting signifies a certain relation between legal authors and their readers. Essentially, 
academic legal authors are impotent and must “prove” every assertion to their readers. The 
implicit irony is that the legal author really has no authority. Cf. Aside, Challenging Law Review 
Dominance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1601, 1602 n.7 (2001) (satirizing the necessity to footnote in 
order to gain authority). 
 61. Levinson, supra note 58, at 382–83 n.33. 
 62. Id.; cf. Richard A. Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1343, 1346 
(1986) (highlighting the absurdity in condensing meaning of a text into a parenthetical, thereby 
disclosing the authorial proposition that meaning is conveyed to the reader). 
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consciously or not, they concede certain authority to authors: readers 
trust that their individual readings of the source would not provide 
them an understanding different from that which the authors purport, 
and readers recognize, albeit implicitly, that information exists apart 
from the knower. Thus, both of these gestures place authors’ 
personas, the alter egos of authors that come through the text, in 
positions of authority over readers. Fundamentally, then, a profuse 
use of footnotes evidences an anxiety of authority or, from a different 
perspective, authors’ attempts to gain deference from their audiences. 
The presence of such an acute version of the anxiety of authority 
is significant because it evidences pressures similar to those under 
which judges write. For judges, the skillful use of precedent enables 
them to make use of a “rhetoric of inevitability,” thereby protecting 
their legitimacy.63 Similarly, for academics, the skillful use of 
attribution—because it signifies a relationship between authors and 
their readers in which the latter group concedes authority to the 
former—fosters precisely the same type of legitimacy. Both the 
construction of a precedential narrative and profuse attribution allow 
authors to assert authority. This commonality between the rhetoric of 
both judicial and academic writing, stemming from the semiotic 
significance of citation, allows academic writing to fit easily within the 
legal narrative without becoming officious. As a result, judges can 
safely bring a law review article within the official narrative while 
ostensibly maintaining their legitimacy. Thus, by negotiating this 
anxiety through the construction of authoritative personas, academics 
can create an affinity with common law judges that significantly 
enhances their probability of success in contributing to the resolution 
of an issue. 
III.  THE STANDARDIZATION OF CITATION WITHIN  
THE ACADEMIC LEGAL TRADITION 
Because the proper use of citation enabled authors to avoid an 
officious intrusion into the legal narrative, authors such as Warren 
and Brandeis succeeded in playing a part in the resolution of legal 
issues. Moreover, because of their success, these authors left a 
 
 63. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“Stare decisis is the 
preferred course because it . . . contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process.”); cf. WALD, supra note 52, at 47–48 (describing how, as an attorney, Abraham Lincoln 
used authority in legal narratives which “derived—as they continue to derive—their authority 
from the rhetoric of inevitability”). 
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permanent mark on the genre of law review articles with regard to 
their language, style, and technique. Their chosen conventions 
became the conventions of the genre and, over time, became 
embedded within the language assumed by academic authors 
publishing in the law reviews.64 In particular, the tendency to footnote 
as a means of textually establishing authority has become a relic that 
only the most assured of authors can avoid. 
As it remains the dominant guide to law review citation,65 The 
Bluebook provides a unique window into how this anxiety of 
authority has become embedded within the language of the law 
review genre. Because first-year law students begin their 
indoctrination into the “complex and intricate directives laid down in 
[The Bluebook]” from day one in their legal writing classes,66 and 
second- and third-year students on law reviews continue their slavish 
devotion to mastering The Bluebook,67 its power as a structuring force 
within the legal community, particularly in normalizing certain 
assumptions, cannot be underestimated.68 As a structuring force, then, 
The Bluebook normalizes assumptions regarding the position of 
authors in relation to their readers, thereby providing a valuable 
source for examining the accepted notions for how to construct a 
persona through citation.69 It is a valuable source for peering into how 
the language used within academic legal writing, and particularly the 
tendency to footnote, is laden with the relics of previous contexts, and 
 
 64. See generally Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Roman Law: A Case Study in the Hazards 
of Legal Scholarship, 31 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 33 (2002) (providing an example of how the 
format and conventions of law review articles play important roles both in shaping the substance 
of articles and also in the careers of authors). 
 65. Christine Hurt, The Bluebook at Eighteen: Reflecting and Ratifying Current Trends in 
Legal Scholarship, 82 IND. L.J. 49, 52 (2007) (“The Bluebook has continued to dominate the 
citation market for the last half century.”). 
 66. Posner, supra note 62, at 1343. 
 67. Jonathan Mermin, Remaking Law Review, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 603, 613 (2004) (“I 
suspect that many students take solace in their seemingly impressive mastery of the Bluebook’s 
intricacies as a counterpoint to their unease at being expected, after just one or two years of law 
school, to pass judgment on the substantive merits of advanced legal scholarship.”). 
 68. See Bacchus, supra note 9, at 246 (“The familiarity bred by that prolonged and intense 
exposure makes The Bluebook . . . a foundational text upon which legal culture is built.”); Hurt, 
supra note 65, at 50–51 (“Like high school students rushing to grab a copy of their school’s 
yearbook to glimpse the personalities and events that captured the eye of school photographers, 
legal scholars can trace important movements in the law and legal scholarship from edition to 
edition [of The Bluebook].”). 
 69. See Bacchus, supra note 9, at 248 (“The Bluebook [is] not so much an artifact as a code, 
in the semiotic sense—a system of signs that does not reflect ‘objective reality,’ but, rather, 
constructs a political and social grammar.”). 
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how those relics may very well be supported by anachronistic 
assumptions. 
First, the existence and the widespread use of The Bluebook 
emphatically underscore the legal community’s fixation with citation 
and, by logical extension, its fixation with establishing authority. By 
ultimately encouraging the growth of the “twenty-six page 
pamphlet . . . to its status as a 389-page manual used at the vast 
majority of law schools,” the legal community demonstrates 
uncommon devotion to ensuring proper citation.70 The community of 
law reviews deems so important the way in which authors appropriate 
and infuse prior thinking into their text, there has developed a market 
able to sustain the incredible commercialization of a once modest 
citation guide.71 This reveals an assumption that is so pervasive within 
the law review community that it is seldom discussed: authors simply 
must cite.72 
Second, the rules of the The Bluebook make clear that the 
publication has normalized the anxiety of authority that authors like 
Warren and Brandeis promulgated. The rules of The Bluebook make 
standard authors concerned about how their work will be received by 
their audience and the fear that it might be dismissed for lacking 
authority.73 For example, Rule 1.2 constructs a system for introducing 
sources of information.74 This system includes signals not only for 
indicating direct authority, but also for identifying tangentially related 
and even contradictory authority.75 By implication, Rule 1.2 teaches 
that authors have not completed their job by merely providing direct 
support for their propositions. They must also find tangentially 
related authority and possibly even contradictory authority. This is 
counterintuitive: why should an author find sources that will only 
marginally further the author’s point and at times may actually 
 
 70. Id. at 250 (referencing the seventeenth edition of The Bluebook). 
 71. Dickerson, supra note 55, at 57–66. Professor Christine Hurt has also argued recently 
that part of the success of The Bluebook, as a publication manual more dominating than any 
other in related disciplines, is sustained by the fact that legal authors must “daily produc[e] . . . 
written materials that are either formally delivered to clients or filed with a government tribunal 
or agency.” Hurt, supra note 65, at 67. 
 72. Bacchus, supra note 9, at 254. 
 73. Id. at 249. For more on anxiety, see supra notes 9, 14. 
 74. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2, at 22–24 (Columbia Law 
Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). 
 75. Id.; see also Bacchus, supra note 9, at 258 (“In an ideal citation, fully utilizing the 
technology of rule 1.2, contradictory authority, indirect authority, and, arguably, authority that 
has an even more distant relationship to a proposition in the text would be found and cited.”). 
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disparage it? The best explanation is that by including contradictory 
authority, the author “can give the appearance of strengthening the 
support for the proposition, because the proffer of contrary authority 
hints that the author’s confidence in her argument can withstand such 
weakening citation.”76 By following Rule 1.2, then, authors construct a 
particular persona: one that is an exhaustive researcher, confident in 
the argument, and expert on the particular topic. 
Such affectations amount to precisely the same gestures that 
early authors were able to make through thorough use of attribution. 
The persona of an exhaustive researcher is valued because of the 
underlying assumption that texts contain meanings that can be 
accurately transferred from one reader to another, apart from the 
latter’s individual discursive interactions with the source. This is 
precisely the same assumption which sustained the practice of 
footnoting abundantly during the emergence of law reviews. The 
underlying process is similar: by passing on to the reader all of this 
previously gathered information, authors assert themselves as the 
experts and thereby gain authority. Moreover, such authority allows 
their pieces to maintain the legitimacy of a judicial opinion if given 
official recognition by judges. Thus, The Bluebook has codified an 
anxiety of authority by having as its philosophical predicate the very 
same assumption that characterizes the authorial persona that 
emerged, at least in part, as a result of legal academics seeking 
acceptance within the official legal narrative. 
IV.  THE USE OF FOOTNOTES COMES WITH SUBSTANTIAL COSTS 
Yet even while the emphasis on footnotes contributed to the 
ability of the law review to sustain a relationship between the law 
review article author and the judicial opinion, it also brought with it a 
burden that the legal community still bears. There are at least three 
different aspects to this burden. First, the emphasis on citation 
negatively affects the style of the genre. Second, all too often the 
emphasis on footnotes masks shallow substance. Finally, the political 
space created by the emphasis on footnoting is in tension with the 
general understanding of citation among student editors. To the 
extent that the actual usage of footnotes diverges from the student 
understanding of their usage, the legal community condones an 
educational failure for which the consequences may be difficult to 
 
 76. Bacchus, supra note 9, at 261. 
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quantify but which are no less severe. In short, although extensive 
footnoting may have helped to cohere scholars’ work to the bench, 
the legal community can only maintain that cohesion with a price.77 
A. Style and Expense 
The style of law review articles suffers because of the emphasis 
on footnoting.78 First, articles heavily dependent on footnotes are 
largely standardized.79 This limits the amount of individuality that 
authors can express through their writing. The Bluebook has 
“cultivate[d] a most dismal sameness of style, a lowest-common-
denominator style.”80 Because that style emphasizes the importance of 
uniformity,81 “[f]lair, humor, and individualism [are] not tolerated in 
the text.”82 Although student editors of the reviews perform much of 
this standardization,83 the authors bear the ultimate responsibility for 
their work. 
 
 77. Judge Edward Becker, nonetheless, has eloquently defended the use of footnotes in 
judicial opinions: 
The primary reason for survival [of footnotes] also reflects their central beauty: They 
enable the writer to address multiple audiences simultaneously. Footnotes allow the 
judge-writer to engage in a legal conversation: with the lawyer or litigant in the case; 
with the reader who wants to drink deep, at least on a particular issue, and draw all 
possible instruction from the opinion; and with the neophyte who wants to 
understand an area of law. 
Becker, supra note 48, at 12. Though this eloquent apology is directed at many of the criticisms 
discussed in Part IV of this Note, it is somewhat inapposite in the law review context. Authors 
of law review pieces are increasingly writing to one another. See infra notes 109–20 and 
accompanying text. Thus, while the readership of law reviews has grown, the interests of that 
audience have become narrower. This eliminates the need to dispense footnotes throughout to 
satisfy the desires of a particular faction of the readership. 
 78. Posner, supra note 62, at 1349 (“The particular casualty of preoccupation with citation 
forms is the style of legal writing.”). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. (“The Bluebook displays an excessive, an unhealthy—one is almost tempted to 
say, since this is still the land of freedom, an un-American—obsession with uniformity.”). 
 82. Austin, Footnote Skulduggery, supra note 6, at 1016. 
 83. See Carol Sanger, Editing, 82 GEO. L.J. 513, 517 (1993) (“[A]rticles are too frequently 
transformed [by student editors] from something written by an author with a distinct voice, 
point of view, and line of argument to something closer to a composition by student committee. 
In its worst form, the method combines unnecessary arrogance with a stubborn adherence to 
rules, sometimes ‘official’ rules and sometimes independently idiosyncratic ones. Whatever their 
provenance, the force and good sense of these rules are wildly overestimated by law review 
editors who find it hard to understand that authors sometimes need to state complicated and 
subtle points in complicated and subtle prose.”). 
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The stylistic deficiencies created by an emphasis on footnoting 
are significant because of the effects they have on the reader. First, 
the inattentive reader is likely deceived into overestimating the 
quality of the writing.84 All footnotes are not created equal,85 and 
many citations are simply “to vacuous and repetitive student notes, 
worthless commentary, and material of doubtful relevance.”86 Thus, 
when a reader approaches a law review article with the “conventional 
assumption . . . that authors carefully select and read the material that 
they cite[,] . . . the addiction to [footnoting] renders this reckoning at 
best dubious, and in reality, ridiculous.”87 
Second, and more important, excessive footnoting turns away 
many potential law review readers.88 On a stylistic level, lengthy and 
exhaustive footnotes are usually unnecessary and can be intimidating 
and/or confuse readers.89 In a surprising celebration of Levesque v. 
Anchor Motor Freight,90 Judge Bruce Marshall Selya praises the case 
because “it is the only full-dress, published appellate opinion . . . that 
contains no citations . . . not a case, not a treatise, not a statute, not a 
law review article.”91 As such, the opinion is efficient, and its 
reasoning accessible. Professor Arthur Austin wryly criticizes the 
4,824 footnotes in a piece published by the New York Law School 
Law Review.92 In contrast to Levesque, the article is anything but 
efficient. Any reader who has the patience to navigate 4,824 footnotes 
 
 84. Abner J. Mikva, Goodbye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647, 653 (1985) (“In my 
early days on Law Review I was told that the footnotes are the real measure of worth in legal 
writing.”). 
 85. Balkin and Levinson put a humorous spin on this fact with a purposeful example of a 
thoroughly vacuous cite. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 858 n.58 (“For an example of 
an article that uses the word ‘shy,’ see J.M. Balkin, supra note 2. . . . For examples of articles 
that use the word ‘don’t,’ see . . . .”). 
 86. Austin, Footnote Skulduggery, supra note 6, at 1017. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Perhaps as more law reviews develop legal blogs that “attempt to educate and inform 
as wide an audience as possible by providing fast, and relatively succinct, commentary on 
current legal controversies,” concern that heavy citation will intimidate potential readers will 
mitigate this specific critique. Anthony Ciolli, Much Ado About Nothing: Why Student 
Scholarship Has Nothing To Fear from Blogs, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 210, 211 (2006), 
http://thepocketpart.org/2006/12/18/ciolli.html. At the same time, however, the growth in legal 
blogs merely furthers the point made in Part V that an author should not be afraid to adopt a 
persona reflecting the response of her audience. 
 89. Austin, Footnote Skulduggery, supra note 6, at 1010. 
 90. Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 91. Selya, supra note 50, 1278. 
 92. Austin, Footnote Skulduggery, supra note 6, at 1011 n.17 (citing Jacobs, supra note 3). 
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in the same article has endurance and diligence beyond the realm of 
most potential readers, even those scholars whose careers have 
predisposed them to prolix scholarship.93 
This narrowing of the audience is significant because “th[e] law, 
as an institution or a science or a high-class mumbo-jumbo, has a job 
to do in the world.”94 Professor Rodell states: 
With law as the only alternative to force as a means of solving the 
myriad problems of the world, it seems to me that the articulate 
among the clan of lawyers might, in their writings, be more 
pointedly aware of those problems, might recognize that the use of 
law to help toward their solution is the only excuse for the law’s 
existence, instead of blithely continuing to make mountain after 
mountain of tiresome, technical molehills.95 
Thus, when the style of an article narrows its audience by creating 
“technical molehills,” a feat substantially aided through the use of 
prolix footnotes, the legal community fails in one of its central 
reasons for existence: to provide “a means to a social end and . . . 
[not], for all the law schools and law firms in the world, [to] be treated 
as [ends in themselves].”96 Thus, to the extent that footnoting narrows 
the audience of an article, it limits the article’s ability to provide a 
cornerstone for meaningful discussion, even within the legal 
community. In light of Professor Rodell’s thoughts regarding the 
purposes of the law, this is a sacrifice that should not remain 
unnoticed. 
B. Substance and Expense 
The impact of excessive footnoting on the actual substance of 
texts may be even more significant than the stylistic deficiencies it 
creates.97 At their best, substantive footnotes allow an author to 
explore issues that are only tangentially related to the main point of 
the text. Used in this regard footnotes can be, and according to some 
 
 93. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 1, at 255 (providing a perfect example of how readers, 
even the brightest and most acute legal professionals, are turned away by excessive citation). 
 94. Rodell, supra note 60, at 283. 
 95. Id. at 284. 
 96. Id. at 286. 
 97. See Roger C. Cramton, “The Most Remarkable Institution”: The American Law Review, 
36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 5 (1986) (“The tendency to provide a citation for every proposition 
distracts the reader and may contribute more to form than substance.”). 
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scholars should be, considered a welcome authorial prop.98 Too often, 
however, these props allow authors to remove analysis from the main 
body and put it below the line.99 Essentially, authors acquire the 
ability to divest from their analysis truly controversial or novel 
statements. “The footnote becomes . . . a means of concealment. . . . 
[Statements] that one hesitates to flaunt above the line sneak[] into 
the footnote.”100 Furthermore, “[h]edges against forthright statements 
in the text are squirreled away for a rainy day.”101 
Perhaps the most famous example of this type of analytical 
divestment occurred in footnote four of United States v. Carolene 
Products Co.102 Footnote four is often taught to first-year law students 
as a heuristic tool for understanding when the judiciary is justified in 
becoming more active. It says that when legislation affects “discrete 
and insular minorities” who cannot vindicate their interests through 
the traditional political machinery, the judiciary can properly conduct 
a more robust review of that legislation. Yet the facts of the case had 
very little to do with “discrete and insular minorities.”103 In fact, 
“Professor Louis Lusky of Columbia Law School, Justice Stone’s 
clerk during the Carolene Products term, has explained . . . that the 
footnote sought to reconcile conflicting views of Chief Justice Hughes 
and Justice Stone arising in another context.”104 Thus, the most 
famous footnote in American legal history was simply obiter 
dictum.105 
This is significant because as Judge Abner Mikva speculates, “I 
would venture a guess that the rule would not have survived as a 
textual statement.”106 If Judge Mikva is correct, then one of the most 
important legal doctrines of American constitutional law initially 
gained traction on a slippery surface. That is, rather than winning the 
 
 98. See, e.g., Mikva, supra 84, at 648 (“A judge is reluctant to excise some beautiful prose 
or sage advice that colleagues or clerks have challenged as superfluous to the decision. What to 
do? Put it in a footnote.”). 
 99. DAVID MELLINKOFF, LEGAL WRITING: SENSE AND NONSENSE 94 (1982). The phrases 
“above” and “below the line” refer to the text with appears on top of the footnote line on a 
page and that which comes below, respectively. 
 100. Id. at 94. 
 101. Id. 
 102. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 103. Mikva, supra note 84, at 649. 
 104. Id. (citing Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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support of his colleagues through open and rational reasoning, Justice 
Stone avoided controversial dialogue by planting the doctrine in a 
footnote. Whether the doctrine is one that should be lauded or 
condemned is not the point here. The point is simply that the 
existence and use of a footnote allowed an undeniably important 
doctrine to be introduced into American jurisprudence, perhaps 
without the direct attention of the Court.107 
Moreover, this divestment of analytical rigor or controversial 
argument from the body of a piece is not limited to judicial opinions. 
As Professor Joel Seligman notes, the style of citations allow law 
review authors and editors “to hide behind their footnotes, 
substituting a forest of annotations and the most ‘neutral’ or 
‘reasonable’ synthesis of formal legal doctrines for original 
examination of what the law actually is or ought to be.”108 This trend, 
toward creating a neutral body of an article by lowering controversial 
and more overtly confrontational discussion to a footnote, may be a 
positive method of garnering consensus for the proposition in the 
body, but it represents a value judgment: authors choose to value 
support for a particular proposition over engaging in completely up-
front dialogue. 
 
 107. Id. Professor Balkin has vividly made this same point in his discussion of footnote two 
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986): 
Here the footnote performs the crucial task of holding the logic of the opinion 
together, by putting off the evil day when these questions will have to be answered. 
The footnote is the red cape dangled in front of the charging bull, and then removed 
at the last second, preserving the life of the matador. 
J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 281 (1989). 
 108. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 
183 (1978); see also James W. Harper, Why Student-Run Law Reviews?, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1261, 
1268–69 (1998) (“[Law Review] [a]uthors are not innocent in the frenzy for footnotes. They 
often contribute to it by carrying on a subdialogue in footnotes, by various kinds of footnote 
‘padding,’ or even by burying their best and most interesting points in footnotes.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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C. Politics and Expense 
One motivation for footnoting is networking. Formerly latent,109 
the use of footnotes and citation as a method of “[m]aking [f]riends 
and [n]etworking” has become overt and overwhelming.110 As 
Professors J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson have made humorously 
clear, footnoting in the contemporary law review is only marginally 
about referencing work that has been probative to an author’s 
analysis: “citation has at least as much to do with making certain 
semiotic gestures to the audience as providing an accurate record of 
an author’s own intellectual paths.”111 In contrast to providing a 
skeleton of sources that an author has used to construct the substance 
of the piece, citation becomes a “political act.”112 
Despite its abundance, student editors generally do not notice 
the political dimension of footnoting, partially because of their 
naivety but also because of their recent experiences in first-year legal 
writing courses which generally stress honest authentication in legal 
 
 109. For example, despite the fact that it was not public at the time, Professor William 
Eskridge has identified the central impediment to Rhonda Rivera’s publication in the elite law 
reviews in the 1970s and 1980s as her politics: 
In the 1970s and 1980s, [Rivera] produced a steady stream of articles on gay legal 
issues. Because such issues were completely marginal in legal education at the time, 
the fanciest law reviews had no interest in publishing them and aspiring tenure 
candidates . . . had no reason to cite or even read them. 
Eskridge, supra note 46, at 980–81 (emphasis added). 
 110. Austin, Footnotes as Product, supra note 6, at 1145. 
 111. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 860. 
 112. See Richard Delgado, The Colonial Scholar: Do Outsider Authors Replicate the Citation 
Practices of the Insiders, but in Reverse?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 969, 969 (1996) (“I showed that 
the major figures who were writing during the heyday of the Civil Rights Movement 
marginalized and ignored the writings of scholars of color to a surprising degree. . . . In a follow 
up article . . . I showed that, although . . . newer scholars were avoiding the errors of their 
predecessors, much of the same preference for in-group recognition . . . held true in 1992.” 
(citing Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) and Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: 
How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992))); Mari 
Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-up Ground, 11 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 5 (1988) (“Citing outsider scholarship is a political act. Tenure and 
promotion review committees typically ask whether a candidate’s work is cited. Readers look to 
citations to determine whether an article speaks to them. When Martha Minow, a Harvard Law 
School professor, cites Audre Lorde, for example, she is saying to women, to people of color, 
and to lesbians ‘I am talking to you. I am learning from you.’ This act brings outsiders into the 
world of ‘Harvardian’ discourse and encourages them to continue writing. It challenges other 
readers to expand their sources and prevents the ghettoization of outsider writing.”). 
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writing.113 During preliminary screening of articles, editors sometimes 
make initial judgments based upon the number of footnotes.114 This is 
largely a reflection of the generally shared assumption among editors 
that footnotes represent authorial research.115 Moreover, during the 
selection of articles, the form and precision of footnotes matter.116 
Editors may use the form and the precision of the footnotes as a 
proxy for the author’s diligence and attention to the piece. 
Notoriously absent from most editors’ review of footnotes is an 
inquiry into what type of politics the footnotes, as a whole, convey to 
the audience.117 That is, editors do not ask the questions: Does the 
author cite theoretical work and thereby push a legal-theory 
approach? Does the author cite only “outside scholars” in an attempt 
to normalize the marginalized? Does the author cite only cases and 
treatises in an attempt to push a conservative analysis? 
Remedying this divergence between the reasons authors cite and 
the reasons editors believe that authors cite could materially benefit 
the entire legal community.118 Editors spend an inordinate amount of 
time in both their own writing and the writing they edit looking to the 
 
 113. See Austin, Footnote Skulduggery, supra note 6, at 1011 (“Authors have recognized 
that discerning, intelligent—or unethical—manipulation of footnotes can be a significant factor 
in achieving promotion, tenure, and status. Paradoxically, many student editors are unaware of 
both the new trend and their role in its development.” (citations omitted)). 
 114. See Posner, supra note 44, at 1134 (discussing how student editors judge quality of an 
article partly on “the number and length of footnotes in it”); cf. Harper, supra note 108, at 1268 
(describing student editors’ zeal for footnotes and their desire to see a footnote in support of 
“every factual assertion and reference to doctrine”). 
 115. For an example of this assumption at work, albeit by an academic, see Deborah R. 
Gerhardt, Plagiarism in Cyberspace: Learning the Rules of Recycling Content with a View 
Towards Nurturing Academic Trust in an Electronic World, 12 RICH. J. L. & TECH., Spring 2006, 
at 19. 
 116. See Eric A. Chiappinelli, Essay, Definite Articles: Using the Law Review Article Type 
Indicator® to Make Law Review Publishing Decisions, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559, 562 (2000) 
(during article selection, editors “want articles in which most sentences are already footnoted in 
conformance with The Bluebook”). 
 117. See Natalie C. Cotton, Comment, The Competence of Students As Editors of Law 
Reviews: A Response to Judge Posner, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 951, 964–66 (describing the process 
editors use in evaluating the strength of an article’s research without mention of inquiry into the 
political posture of that research). 
 118. The prominent legal scholar, Lawrence Friedman, acknowledged that the norms of law 
reviews can, and do, shape legal scholarship when he stated “[a]fter all, an institution (law 
review) so entrenched is bound to affect the very nature of legal scholarship—both in formal 
senses (for example, the length of articles); and in the substantive sense (what people write 
about).” Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments, 75 
DENV. U. L. REV. 661, 661 (1998). 
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past for support.119 Were the political dynamic of footnoting more 
apparent, students could actively choose whether to employ or bypass 
such a strategy in their own writing without feeling the pressure to air 
out the text with large amounts of footnotes. Perhaps even more 
beneficial to scholars, editors could spend less time haggling with 
authors about whether an above-the-line proposition needs support 
and whether a particular source is the most effective attribution and 
defer to authors, knowing that they have personal reasons for their 
preferences. Finally, scholars would have less reason to footnote 
automatically and student editors might become more cautious in 
using the number of footnotes as any type of proxy, thereby liberating 
prospective authors from playing the numbers game. In sum, the 
education editors receive from their law review experience would be 
materially advanced because they would have more opportunity to 
engage in forward-looking, critical analysis in editing and authoring 
pieces for their law reviews.120 
V.  FOOTNOTING ANXIETIES IN CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT 
On the one hand, authorial anxieties and tensions inhere in 
footnoting, providing legal scholarship with a profound capacity to 
maintain a presence in the official legal narrative. On the other hand, 
however, the legal community, consciously or not, bears the burden 
of excessive citation. Intuitively, this value judgment seems well 
worth it: in exchange for a number of stylistic, substantive, and 
constructive deficiencies caused by excessive footnoting, scholars 
acquire relatively easy access to the bench because they can construct 
authorial personas that affect anxieties intrinsic to the common law 
system. By placing those anxieties within the contemporary legal 
setting, however, the decision to maintain this value judgment 
without deliberate reflection is problematic. 
 
 119. In fact, this is a problem that professors often complain of regarding the student editing 
process. Professor Daniel Solove hints as much by saying: “A . . . problem is that sometimes 
editors want to footnote every sentence that can be footnoted.” Daniel J. Solove, Law Review 
Editing: Some Suggestions for Reform, Concurring Opinions, Mar. 13, 2007 http://www. 
concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/03/some_pet_peeves.html. 
 120. Judges, as well, would benefit from correcting the divergence. The abundance of 
footnotes conditions editors to think that the force created by the citation is a valuable proxy for 
the efficacy of a piece of legal writing. Given that most editors become practitioners, this 
conditioning carries over outside the academy. The brief with 301 footnotes drafted by Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore during the Texaco-Pennzoil litigation provides a quintessential example of 
how this conditioning affects judges. Austin, Footnotes as Product, supra note 6, at 1134–35 n.16. 
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Scholars no longer write primarily for the bench.121 Over the last 
fifty years, law school faculties have become much more diverse: 
“[n]o one who is familiar with the contemporary legal academy can 
fail to realize that we are divided by far more than conflicting 
views.”122 As a result of this faculty diversification, “legal scholarship 
today is different, much more complex, and in many ways totally 
anarchic.”123 “Fewer and fewer articles offer a way of resolving an 
important legal problem through a purportedly ‘best understanding’ 
of traditional legal materials.”124 Such articles have been largely 
replaced by what Judge Harry Edwards terms “impractical 
scholarship.”125 By impractical, Judge Edwards primarily means 
scholarship that does not help practitioners or judges resolve a legal 
dispute by failing to recognize that “each . . . is constrained by a 
complicated mass of authoritative texts.”126 In other words, many 
authors are no longer writing to influence directly the way in which 
 
 121. See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971–1999, 75 
IND. L.J. 1009, 1013 (2000) (“[I]t is easy to conclude that the most elite journals are publishing 
primarily for the scholar, rather than the bench or the bar.”); cf. Sanford Levinson, The 
Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or, Why, and to Whom, Do I Write the Things I Do?), 
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389, 392 (1992) (referring to two articles he had previously written, 
Professor Levinson stated: “[l]ike most of what I write, neither of these articles takes a 
recognizable position on any of the most contentious constitutional issues of the day, at least if 
they are defined in terms of those that are likely to come before a judge”). 
 122. Levinson, supra note 121, at 390. 
 123. Friedman, supra note 118, at 666. 
 124. Levinson, supra 121, at 391. 
 125. Edwards, supra 39, at 46. This assertion is complicated, however. In 1996, Professor 
Michael Saks, Howard Larsen, and Carol Hodne conducted a unique comparison of law school 
publications from both 1960 and 1985 in an effort to survey any increase in theoretical 
scholarship. Michael J. Saks, Howard Larsen & Carol J. Hodne, Is There a Growing Gap 
Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review 
Articles One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353 (1996). They concluded: “The top-
quintile journals seem to have increasingly become the province of legal scholars and the most 
experimental kind of scholarship, and less a forum for exchanges among legal scholars, 
practitioners, and judges.” Id. at 374. They also asserted, however, that on the whole there had 
not been a decrease in practical scholarship because the emergence of specialized journals had 
provided increased capacity for legal publication. Id. at 370–71. Despite this latter finding, 
however, the importance of the increased theoretical focus of the elite journals is critical 
because the courts, especially the Supreme Court, generally cite to such journals. See Sirico, 
supra note 121, at 1010 (“Most of the Court’s citations continue to refer to journals that are 
generally regarded as elite.”). 
 126. Edwards, supra note 39, at 55. 
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judges decide cases.127 In fact, “it’s quite likely that [although] an 
earlier generation of academics would have gladly traded ten citations 
in the Harvard Law Review for one citation in a Supreme Court 
opinion. . . . many contemporary academics would find this a bad 
trade.”128 
Though this diversity in purpose may be criticized, an incidental 
benefit of it should be that authors can construct personas with 
specific audiences in mind. For example, consider two different types 
of authors. First, take the student seeking to publish a traditional case 
note. “For reasons both structural and logistical, students have long 
played the role of reporters in the legal academy,”129 writing notes 
that “summariz[e] current legal developments.”130 The narrow 
doctrinal approach of traditional case notes is appropriate because it 
plays to the skill of organizing and sorting precedent recently 
acquired in the first year of law school, and it eliminates the need for 
an expansive theoretical background required for sophisticated 
normative critiques. Additionally, such notes often provide the judges 
with whom such students may clerk a unique opportunity to see their 
writing skill, analytical capacity, and perhaps snippets of a judicial 
philosophy.131 By both scholastic purpose and personal ambition, the 
audience for student notes is often quite precise: the judiciary. For the 
student, then, it is not only appropriate but a sign of maturity to be 
able to assume the anxieties of the judge and to write under such 
pressure. Thus, to cite often and thoroughly fits a student.132 
 
 127. Shortly before Judge Edwards had made this point, Professor Rubin stated: 
The entire point of standard legal scholarship is to explore and contrast the pragmatic 
implications of conflicting normative positions . . . . The most promising discourse for 
standard legal scholarship . . . is not the vaguely articulated neo-formalism of the 
courts, but prescriptive arguments based on consciously acknowledged normative 
positions. 
Rubin, supra note 18, at 1893. 
 128. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 6, at 865 n.81. 
 129. Stephen I. Vladeck, That’s So Six Months Ago: Challenges to Student Scholarship in the 
Age of Blogging, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 31, 36 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/ 
2006/09/06/vladeck.html. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Moreover, the audience for student scholarship is not limited to judges but also 
includes other future employers. See Nathan H. Saunders, Note, Student-Edited Law Reviews: 
Reflections and Responses of an Inmate, 49 Duke L.J. 1663, 1671 (2000) (discussing how the 
work product and internalization of the editing process provides value to future employers). 
 132. This explains the tendency to cite in this Note. Though this is most certainly not a 
doctrinal piece, as a student, there are particularly strong institutional pressures, deriving largely 
from the editing process, to cite thoroughly. Without such citation, as a student, publication 
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In contrast, as a self-proclaimed “constitutional theorist,” 
Professor Levinson writes foremost to other theoretical scholars.133 As 
a result, he does not have to wage a credibility campaign through 
purportedly exhaustive research. Because he dialogues with an 
audience not bound by the same pressures as judges, he does not have 
to burden his authorial persona with the anxieties intrinsic to the 
common law system. Theorists do not necessarily have to exploit the 
“rhetoric of inevitability.” Rather, theorists can prove their credibility 
through the weight of their arguments, the novelty of their language, 
and the nuance of their thoughts. In short, legal scholars willing to 
borrow ideas and paradigms from other disciplines should be able to 
garner control of their texts and audiences in ways that mimic the 
scholars of those disciplines without having to confront guilt for not 
having footnoted copiously. 
This is not to say, however, that clever wit or novel thinking 
should necessarily replace thorough research. The suggestion is rather 
that an authorial persona, as constructed through the use of citation, 
should reflect the audience to which the particular author writes. In 
determining the proper method of citation for a particular piece, 
authors should consider several factors. First, it is important that 
authors know their audiences. Second, authors should cite in a way 
that befits the tone and substance of the article. Third, authors should 
consider the role the piece will play in their careers, asking, for 
example, if it is a tenure-track piece. Fourth, authors should consider 
whether they want to gain cross-discipline attention. Thus, there are 
numerous factors that should play a role, but the importance of each 
factor ultimately derives from the purposes of the article, making the 
decision uniquely one for the author to make prior to drafting the 
piece. 
Again, it is important to note that although the immediate 
audience for legal scholarship is in some ways narrower than ever 
before, it is, in some ways, also more expansive. That is, the majority 
of legal scholarship is written for other legal scholars. Contemporary 
legal scholars, however, because they are willing to borrow paradigms 
from other fields, are becoming ever more adept at gauging and 
evaluating different types of scholarship and categorizing that 
scholarship as good, bad, or mediocre based upon its relative impact. 
 
would likely not be possible. In contrast, scholars writing theoretical scholarship are under very 
different pressures. See supra notes 121–28 and accompanying text. 
 133. Levinson, supra note 121, at 390. 
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Thus, some scholars have no need to adopt the authorial persona that 
has been institutionalized within the law review genre. Their target 
audience is perfectly competent to assess the merits of their work 
apart from the persona of the exhaustive researcher. In light of this 
and the fact that footnoting does exact a burden, it is incumbent upon 
authors to select their personas and not allow the anxieties 
normalized through traditional footnoting practices and The 
Bluebook to direct that decision subconsciously. 
CONCLUSION 
Behind the emphasis on citation and footnoting in academic legal 
writing are anxieties of authority and credibility. The historic 
relationship between law review article authors and the bench 
provides a unique explanation for the existence of those anxieties and 
how authors have used them to fulfill their purposes of helping judges 
decide issues. Yet for many authors who do not write for the bench, 
those anxieties constrain authorial personas and should be 
reevaluated in the contemporary setting. Essentially, scholars who 
write articles primarily directed to other scholars should be aware of 
the costs that an overemphasis on footnoting externalizes onto the 
broader legal community. With such awareness, scholars may not 
desire to utilize the classic law review persona. This standard persona 
has and still can contribute positively to the capacity of a scholar to 
establish and maintain legitimacy within the official legal narrative. 
Nevertheless, as the legal academy continues to diversify and 
establish its own identity apart from the bench, the default authorial 
persona of law review articles should more appropriately reflect the 
particular purposes of the article. Moreover, such a change is likely to 
enhance the productivity of student-edited law reviews and student 
writings, eliminate persistent tension between faculty authors and 
student editors, and generally improve communication between 
authors and audiences by abolishing the single standard for judging 
citation. 
